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— FROM TERRITORIAL COHESION TO 
REGIONAL SPATIAL JUSTICE: The Well-being of 
Future Generations Act in Wales
Rhys Jones, BRyonny Goodwin-hawkins and Michael woods
Abstract
The European Union’s flagship Cohesion Policy faces evidence of dubious economic 
effectiveness and growing political and philosophical critiques of the very ideals of 
furthering European integration. This article examines ambitions for territorial cohesion 
as they have been operationalized through regional development in Wales. We argue that 
a potential alternative to the failed realization of territorial cohesion lies in the principles 
of spatial justice. While territorial cohesion has typically emphasized the redistribution 
of funds to ‘lagging’ regions, spatial justice, as we define it, is premised upon enabling 
regions to assert their own capacity to act and pursue positive visions of regional futures, 
consider the implications of space and scale for the achievement of justice, and define well-
being, development and the ‘good life’ in ways that reflect regional priorities. We examine 
three ways in which recent political discourses and policy mechanisms in Wales resonate 
with these ideals. We focus on attempts to envision a progressive Welsh future, develop 
alternative spaces and scales of governance, and redefine and pluralize understandings of 
progress and well-being. The article concludes by reflecting on the practical and conceptual 
implications of rescaling spatial justice to regional contexts.
Introduction
The European Union’s (EU) Cohesion Policy is under pressure. An EU flagship 
policy since the late 1990s, Cohesion promised to ‘give to the people of Europe [a] 
unique blend of economic well-being, social cohesiveness and high overall quality of 
life’ (European Commission,  1994:1). Yet now the policy faces evidence of dubious 
economic effectiveness allied with growing political and philosophical critiques of the 
very ideals of furthering European integration. Ambitions for territorial cohesion 
appear particularly hollow given increasing economic disparities between European 
regions. Of the 26 countries with available data, 16 registered increases in the regional 
dispersion of GDP at NUTS3 level between 2007 and 2011, including France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom (Eurostat,  2012). Economic 
disparities fuel more radical political narratives, in turn eroding the values behind 
Cohesion (González et al., 2015). Hence, against a background of rising inequality and 
austerity politics, populist parties loudly question the European project’s very viability. 
Left behind despite Cohesion’s promises, the ‘places that don’t matter’, as Rodríguez-
Pose (2018) provocatively suggests, may be taking their revenge.
In this article, we examine––conceptually and empirically––whether the concept 
of spatial justice may offer a potential alternative to the failed promises of territorial 
cohesion. In recent years, several scholars have begun to advocate spatial justice as 
a means of understanding and alleviating socio-economic and political inequalities, 
primarily at the urban scale (e.g. Fainstein, 2010; Soja, 2010). This has, in turn, sparked 
interest in how spatial justice could be applied in regional or territorial contexts 
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(e.g. Kearns et al., 2014; Lang and Görmar, 2019). While territorial cohesion has typically 
emphasized redistributing funds to ‘problem’ or ‘lagging’ regions, a regionalized spatial 
justice starts from the premise that regions should be able to: (1) assert their own capacity 
actively to define and pursue policy goals based on ideas of justice (cf. Malloy, 2010); (2) 
consider the implications of space and scale for the promotion of justice; (3) be able 
to define well-being, development and the ‘good life’ in ways that reflect regional 
priorities. Despite growing interest in the potential of spatial justice, there remains a 
need to examine both the conceptual and practical implications of regionalizing spatial 
justice, particularly in an EU context. In conceptual terms, there is a need to examine 
fully the implications of rescaling spatial justice from the urban to the regional scale. If, 
as is commonly accepted, space is more than merely a container for social processes of 
different kinds (Soja, 1989), then there is a need to reflect on the impact that defining 
spatial justice as a regional, a opposed to an urban, goal has on its meaning and operation. 
And there are also practical or policy-related implications to such a process of rescaling. 
To what extent does spatial justice allow regions to escape from dependency discourses 
and define progressive futures for themselves? To what extent does spatial justice enable 
regions to self-define progress, development and the ‘good life’? Further, how might 
the interface between existing approaches and emerging interventions reflect path 
dependency, and broader continuities and changes? Our aim in this article is to answer 
these significant conceptual and policy-related questions.
We ground these concerns through an empirical focus on the case study of the 
region of Wales; one that has been subject to EU Cohesion Policy but is now trialling 
new policy goals embedded, we contend, in notions of spatial justice. Years of policy and 
academic discourse has problematized this small constituent country of the UK, marked 
by processes of post-industrial change and rural poverty, as a ‘lagging’ region. Years of 
EU funding has, in turn, promised to help Wales ‘catch up’ with more prosperous regions. 
In the 2014-20 EU programming period alone, Wales received 20% of the UK’s total 
structural funds allocation (Woolford and Hunt, 2016) for scarcely 5% of the population. 
Yet after almost two decades of inflated funding, the GDP map has barely changed for 
Wales and a Welsh majority voted to leave the EU in the Brexit referendum, with funding 
levels playing no predictive role in the vote (Becker et al., 2017).1 Furthermore, Wales is 
a region of the UK that is beginning to experiment with new modes of policy delivery; 
ones that are redolent, we suggest, of an approach grounded in notions of spatial justice. 
It is, therefore, a highly appropriate case study for examining the interplay between 
modalities of government informed by principles of territorial cohesion and those based 
on understandings of spatial justice.
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we review the literature 
on territorial cohesion and spatial justice. We particularly seek to highlight the 
distinctiveness of a spatial justice approach to addressing spatial inequalities at the 
regional scale. We then provide additional background on Wales as a case study, and 
detail the extensive empirical research underpinning our arguments. In the subsequent 
section, we discuss the recent transition in policy interventions in Wales from approaches 
reflecting territorial cohesion ideals to approaches that are, we believe, more illustrative 
of a desire to promote spatial justice. In particular, we identify recent political discourses 
and policy mechanisms in Wales that attempt to: highlight the Welsh region’s capacity 
to define a more just Welsh future; develop alternative regional and scalar frameworks 
that have the potential to promote spatial justice; redefine and pluralize understandings 
of progress and well-being. We conclude with reflections on the broader implications of 
shifting from more urban to more regional forms of spatial justice.
1 Public disillusionment with the EU occurred for numerous reasons. Moreover, the perceived ‘failure’ of EU regional 
investment may have been due to other factors, not least the macroeconomic policies of the UK, which have 
implicitly favoured certain regions above others.
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Reflecting on territorial cohesion and spatial justice
 — Making sense of territorial cohesion
Territorial inequalities and uneven development have for some time been 
acknowledged as major concerns for Europe. Over the past two decades, the European 
Commission (2004: 27) has responded by promoting Cohesion Policy, understood as ‘a 
more balanced development [achieved] by reducing existing disparities, preventing 
territorial imbalances and making both sectoral policies which have a spatial impact and 
regional policy more coherent’. Thus, territorial cohesion can be read as a policy attempt 
to address spatialized issues that risk undermining the EU’s political and economic 
strength. In policy practice, such spatial issues are primarily understood as measurable 
differences in GDP between NUTS2 regions. Thereby defined by economic indicators, 
territorial cohesion is operationalized through financial mechanisms, including the 
European Social Fund and European Regional Development Fund. Variance in regional 
GDP is not necessarily considered problematic per se. Rather, there is a belief that the EU 
cannot afford the economic burden of ‘lagging’ regions, which threaten to diminish the 
overall competitiveness of the EU as a whole (Jones et al., 2019). That these regions are 
understood to contain underutilized or unrealized territorial potential is reflected in the 
labelling of cohesion funding as regional ‘investment’, rather than redistribution or charity.
Beyond practical concerns, the concept of territorial cohesion has itself been the 
subject of considerable conceptual critique. First, scholars have described territorial 
cohesion as an ambiguous concept (e.g. Mirwaldt et al., 2008; Servillo, 2010; Atkinson 
and Zimmerman, 2016). Sometimes, it is unclear whether territorial cohesion is intended 
as the policy outcome or the policy itself, and the European Commission has remained 
reluctant to fully define what it actually hopes to realize through promoting cohesion. 
While this conceptual ‘fuzziness’ has certainly helped territorial cohesion become 
accepted across EU member states (Davoudi, 2005; Faludi, 2007), closer inspection 
suggests that states and regions may be simply manipulating the concept to suit their 
own purposes (e.g. Boland, 2005; Faludi, 2015; Van Well, 2012). A second critique relates 
to the tendency for territorial cohesion to render the EU into a singular geopolitical 
object to be measured, mapped, analysed and acted upon (Luukkonen and Moisio, 2016). 
Viewed as a political technology, territorial cohesion poses a challenge to nation-states’ 
identities, potentially rescaling territory––as a form of political calculation––so that it 
operates at a European rather than national scale (Elden, 2010).
Third, there is potential for a discourse of territorial cohesion––especially 
when allied with talk of regional inequalities––to reinforce a perception that certain 
‘underperforming’ regions are somehow problematic or lacking. But the problem with 
this view of some regions being stragglers in a race is that the race has already been run 
and the finish line drawn by stronger, faster sprinters (Hadjimichalis, 2019). There is a 
further danger of a status of inadequacy or even victimhood being ascribed to ‘lagging’ 
regions. Fourth, by focusing on particular economic and social measures of success or 
failure, territorial cohesion tends to discursively present development, well-being and 
the ‘good life’ in narrow ways, leaving little scope for alternative measures of progress 
to emerge. Again, limited visions of success or failure reinforce the notion that ‘lagging’ 
regions have to play a game, whose rules are defined elsewhere.
Finally, territorial cohesion is predicated on problematic spatial imaginaries. 
While NUTS2 level GDP maps tell us an important story about regional disparities, 
their deployment in territorial cohesion policies effectively privileges some regions as 
the normative standard, while the laggards light up luridly, made problematic through 
an economic cartography always beyond their choosing (cf. González et al., 2015). 
Moreover, these maps highlight how particular geographies of governance have been 
established in different parts of Europe, often with the explicit aim of accessing EU 
funds. Yet, there is a danger that the regional geographies created in this way serve to 
JONES, GOODWIN-HAWKINS AND WOODS 4
reproduce the inequalities they were designed to ameliorate. There is certainly evidence 
that the two Welsh regions devised to access EU funds have confounded attempts to 
address socio-economic inequalities, and we return to this paradox shortly.
We consider that the issues outlined so far highlight the need to move beyond 
territorial cohesion towards alternative approaches to addressing regional inequalities 
in Europe (Davoudi, 2007). Some evidence suggests that the EU is itself exploring 
alternatives. For example, Hadjimichalis (2019) claims that while territorial cohesion 
was high on the political agenda before the crisis of 2008-2010, it has now become 
totally downplayed. Hadjimichalis may be overstating matters, but there is clearly an 
appetite in academic and policy circles to develop alternative conceptualizations to 
territorial cohesion. Spatial justice may provide one such option.
 — Approaching spatial justice
Spatial justice has been subject to academic and policy discussion in two main 
periods. Beginning in the late 1960s, the first period was marked by an interrogation 
of spatial justice by authors such as: Davies (1968), who attempted to understand how 
local services were distributed with respect to the needs of designated service areas; 
Lefebvre (1970), who conceptualized the fundamental socio-political changes needed to 
secure a spatially just society, and; Harvey (1973: 306), who viewed the city as not only the 
culmination of the spatial (in)justices associated with capitalism but also the beginnings of 
their abolition. The second period of spatial justice literature began in the new millennium, 
with the publication of seminal books including Fainstein’s (2010) The Just City––in 
which she argued for the redistribution of resources and opportunities, the celebration 
of diversity, and democracy––and Soja’s (2010) Seeking Spatial Justice, where the struggle 
over metropolitan transport in Los Angeles was used as a case study for a general argument 
about spatial rights and the processes that create injustice at the urban scale.
The academic literature on spatial justice possesses key features. First, it is a 
concept that has been overwhelmingly approached through reference to cities and the 
urban scale. Cities have been viewed as manifestations of the economic inequalities 
that characterize modern society, as well as key sites for imagining alternative and just 
socio-spatial forms. Yet there is no necessary link between spatial justice and the urban 
scale. Merrifield and Swyngedouw (1997: 3) maintain that justice should take spatial, 
temporal and scalar differences into account. Similarly, Soja (2010: 20) observes that 
‘justice and injustice are infused into the multi-scalar geographies in which we live, 
from the intimacies of the household to the uneven development of the global economy’. 
While we should not, then, view spatial justice as exclusively articulated through the 
urban scale, we need also recognize that spatial in/justices do not necessarily play out 
in the same ways across different spaces and scales. Consequently, we need to examine 
the implications of rescaling spatial justice from an urban to more regional, national and 
global contexts (Kearns and Reid-Henry, 2009; Kearns et al., 2014).
Second, there is a need to interrogate the relationship between space and justice. 
Work in Geography and beyond has shown that space should not be viewed merely as a 
container for socio-economic processes (e.g. Soja, 1989). Consequently, Dabinett (2011: 
2391) has argued that we should avoid seeing space as merely a container for justice, 
or spatial justice as ‘shorthand for social justice in space’. Rather, space needs to be 
interrogated to determine the various, far-reaching ways that it influences in/justice. 
Landscapes, for example, can be read as material and symbolic representations of past 
injustices, and as spatial contexts that help to reproduce inequalities (Mitchell, 2003: 
788). Similarly, there is a need to consider how spaces of governance may reinforce 
inequalities and injustices of different kinds or allow for new approaches to justice to 
be imagined (Fainstein, 2001).
Third, researchers have highlighted the significance of capacity for 
understandings of spatial justice, particularly through the ability of stakeholders to 
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shape more just social and economic forms. Various authors approach justice from 
the perspective of capacity. Lefebvre (1970) and other contemporaries claimed that 
justice involved the right to take part in urban transformation processes, implying an 
‘active participation in the political life, management, and the administration of the 
city’ (Dikeç, 2001: 1790). More recently, Sen’s (1993; 2009) capabilities approach has 
influenced Israel and Frenkel’s (2017: 2) notion of a justice deriving from a ‘person’s 
capabilities and … liberties’. Such a focus on capacity at the individual and urban scale 
can be rescaled into a conception of spatial justice as reflecting a particular region’s 
capabilities and liberties to shape its own future. As we shall see in our case study, the 
capacity to define just futures moves us well beyond the kind of regional victimhood that 
is reinforced by territorial cohesion.
Fourth, spatial justice should be understood in plural ways. While some 
universalist goals may be constant, authors like Sen (2009) argue that we must avoid 
imagining a perfectly just situation against which to measure reality in all spatial and 
temporal circumstances. Israel and Frenkel (2017) similarly insist that there is no single 
definition of justice: it should be assessed on the basis of individual opportunities in a 
given context, alongside plural understandings of what is fair and what may create well-
being (Sen, 1993). Storper (2011: 19), too, maintains that although ‘freedom and liberty; 
the ability to live our lives and be happy; and [the] development of our capabilities’ 
may well be common goals, in practice ‘different individuals, groups and territories … 
fill in the detail on these goals in rather different ways’. Thus, approaching spatial 
justice plurally points to the need to go beyond universalizing measures like GDP when 
seeking to define justice and well-being. Such sentiments echo the growing significance 
placed within public policy on seeking to promote well-being and happiness, not just 
wealth (e.g. Stiglitz et al., 2009), and the efforts of critical geographers to promote 
vital geographies, encompassing ‘fairness, care … human rights, and solidarity with 
environmental and social justice’ (Kearns and Reid-Henry, 2009: 554).
Overall, the above discussion highlights our significant and original conceptual 
contribution in this article; namely our explication of the key differences between 
conventional approaches to territorial cohesion and the literature on spatial justice. 
We have also begun to foreground some of the consequences of operationalizing the 
latter concept at the regional scale. While territorial cohesion tends towards discourses 
of victimhood and helplessness, we suggest that scaling spatial justice to the region 
emphasizes the need to develop regions’ capacities to transform themselves. Whereas 
territorial cohesion foregrounds a rather limited conceptualization of development and 
progress, spatial justice stresses plurality; hence regions should be able to define their 
own, specific, development routes. Finally, territorial cohesion has arguably imposed 
spatial and scalar straightjackets on regions, making the furthering of more equal 
and just societies more, not less, challenging. Spatial justice may potentially empower 
regions to define alternative spaces of governance that are required to promote spatial 
justice in effective ways. However, the potential of spatial justice signalled by the 
literature is still largely supposition, with little empirical work yet examining the 
effectiveness of such an alternative approach. As we move now to our case study, we 
contribute an original case study exploring the value of spatial justice in addressing 
socio-economic inequalities at a regional scale.
Case study and methods
Wales, for a number of reasons, presents a highly appropriate case through 
which to examine the conceptual consequences of a transition at a regional scale from 
territorial cohesion measures to an approach informed by spatial justice.
First, Wales, as a region of the UK, has long been beset by challenging socio-
economic circumstances and it has sought to respond to them through targeted and, 
increasingly, bespoke policy interventions. Challenges include the contemporary 
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malaise of an economy historically dominated by agriculture and heavy industry, a low-
skilled and ageing population, poor infrastructures, and an economic geography offering 
‘the least opportunity to benefit from “economic” mass of any UK country or region’ 
(Prince, 2016: 42). Since the devolution of power in 1999 through the creation of a Welsh 
Government, the case has been made for addressing entrenched ‘Welsh problems’ using 
distinct policy instruments (House of Commons, 1997). As Heley (2013: 1326) writes, 
devolution ‘has come with the understanding that longstanding social and economic 
disparities’ in Wales ‘cannot be adequately addressed through generic, UK-wide strategy 
and resource allocation’. The Welsh Government’s flagship programme to alleviate 
poverty in disadvantaged areas has been the recently disestablished Communities First 
scheme (Hincks and Robson, 2010), but other place-based schemes have sought to 
address socio-economic challenges in more targeted ways (e.g. Welsh Government, 2018). 
The key point here is that Wales has had, especially since 1999, an administrative 
capacity and political will to address socio-economic challenges, and Wales-specific 
policy mechanisms have been developed to address them (cf. Jones et al., 2005).
Second, ‘Welsh problems’ have enabled certain parts of Wales to qualify for EU 
funding. As Royles (2006: 138) indicates, by ‘unique coincidence’ the NUTS2 region 
West Wales and the Valleys was first designated as what was then called an ‘Objective 1’ 
area in 2000, just a year after executive devolution had occurred in Wales. As ‘[p]laques 
bearing the “Funded by the European Union” logo became nigh on ubiquitous’ (Wyn 
Jones and Rumbul, 2013: 559), the promise of the increased EU funding flows associated 
with Objective 1 status brought ‘cautious optimism that the problems that had marked 
out Wales as one of the poorest regions in the EU could now be addressed’ (Fudge, 2006: 
55). A substantial amount of EU funding has indeed been allocated to Wales since 2000, 
with €2.4 billion allocated through the ERDF and ESF during 2014-20 alone (Woolford 
and Hunt, 2016). West Wales and the Valleys (see Figure 1) is one of only two NUTS2 
regions in the UK calculated to be net recipients of EU funds, equating to around £79 or 
€90 per capita (Ifan et al., 2016). As we show below, regional development in Wales has 
been characterized by both hope for the potential promised by EU Territorial Cohesion 
and considerable disillusionment in terms of its actual impact.
Third, the Welsh Government has committed to promote sustainable 
development, well-being and justice (Bishop and Flynn, 2004). Section 121 of the 
Government of Wales Act 1998 required the Welsh Government ‘to make a scheme 
setting out how it proposes, in the exercise of its functions, to promote sustainable 
development’. Most recently, this commitment has been manifest in the Well-being of 
Future Generations Act 2015. The Act proceeded from a national conversation on ‘The 
Wales We Want’ by 2050 (Jones and Ross, 2016), and reflects an attempt by the Welsh 
Government to collaborate with stakeholders across Wales to develop a distinctive 
approach to sustainable development. This legislation is particularly significant given 
the emphasis it places on, first, redefining sustainable development as a concern 
with well-being and justice, and, second, defining the ‘good life’ in Wales in varied 
and inclusive ways, which extend beyond economic measures of success (see also 
Welsh Government, 2011: iv). While some of this policy emphasis may reflect the 
Welsh Government’s need ‘to demonstrate that devolution [is] “making a difference”’ 
(Royles, 2006: 147), we contend that it also represents a significant attempt to define 
the future for Wales in progressive and distinctive ways, and to envisage more socio-
spatially just outcomes.
Finally, the imminent departure (at the time of writing) of the UK from the 
EU makes the discussion about the transition from EU funding in Wales even more 
pertinent. Since the Brexit referendum, attempts have been made to define replacement 
funding mechanisms for Wales. The Welsh Government’s (2017a: 7) Regional Investment 
in Wales After Brexit insists that ‘[r]egional disparities remain a challenge and we can 
only address them by setting a national strategy underpinned by regionally designed and 
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managed action plans’. While there are echoes of territorial cohesion in sentences such 
as ‘Investments must be targeted geographically’ (ibid., our emphasis), the white paper 
begins to shift the discourse from the imminent loss of funding towards the potential 
for new ways of recognizing the ‘long-term challenges’ facing Wales, along with the 
‘need for a more granular understanding of the specific needs of different places’ (ibid.: 
13). Although the contours of these new strategies are still opaque, the reality of Brexit 
clearly points to an opportunity for Wales to redefine ways of addressing regional 
inequalities; ones that extend beyond European-level concerns with territorial cohesion.
The empirical material we discuss below focuses on these issues. Our data 
forms part of a broader Horizon 2020 project, which brings together 16 partners from 
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13 European states. The project aims to develop new policy mechanisms to enable 
European, national and regional governance agencies to address territorial inequalities 
more effectively. Importantly, the project also seeks to envision a future for Europe in 
which the distribution of resources is consistent with principles of spatial justice. To this 
end, one phase of research has developed a series of regional case studies within Europe, 
of which Wales is one. To date, a large amount of data has been collected and analysed, 
including: 69 expert interviews conducted in 2017-18 in six EU member states (Finland, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland and the UK); and, documentary research on public 
speeches and regional policy and cohesion reports published between 2004 and 2017. In 
interviews and through documentary research, we were interested in how policymakers 
conceptualized territorial inequalities, both within their regions and across the EU. We 
examined how ideas of territorial cohesion and spatial justice (and closely associated 
terms such as ‘well-being’ and the ‘good life’) are being used.
We discuss one subset of IMAJINE’s data here, drawing from qualitative data 
collected through semi-structured expert interviews with Welsh policy actors. We 
interviewed senior civil servants and advisors from the devolved Welsh Government, 
and senior figures from local government in Wales. We aimed for a selective sample of 
respondents, covering a range of policy sectors, including education, health and transport 
(Coyne, 1997). We also draw on documentary evidence, namely Welsh Government 
policies, strategies and statements issued over the past 10-15 years. We were especially 
interested in those documents that sought to describe Wales’ commitment––either 
independently or in concert with the EU––to addressing regional socio-spatial 
inequalities. We transcribed and coded the interview transcripts with NVivo, using a 
mixture of codes that were data-generated and others reflecting key conceptual themes 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The coding framework was agreed by the project team 
to ensure methodological rigour and consistency (Adair and Pastori, 2011). We used 
rapid appraisal techniques to identify and initially analyse documentary evidence 
(Kuchartz, 2014), noting common patterns within and between documents. Our goal in 
the empirical discussion below has been to use quotes that reflect dominant themes in 
the interviews and in the documentary evidence, as well as noting areas where alternative 
or contradictory themes emerged.
From territorial cohesion to spatial justice in Wales
Three key themes from our data illustrate the tentative transition in Wales 
from an approach to regional inequalities based on the logics of territorial cohesion, 
towards an alternative that is, we maintain, increasingly resonant with the principles 
of spatial justice. We discuss how: (1) a narrative of victimhood is changing into one of 
regional capacity; (2) more meaningful spaces and scales of governance are replacing 
instrumentally-defined regions; and, (3) multiple measures of progress and well-being 
are gaining salience over a fixation on GDP.
 — From dependency to capacities to act
Many of our interview respondents bemoaned the role that territorial cohesion 
has played in sustaining a discourse of dependence and victimhood in Wales. For 
example, an interviewee who joined the then-new Welsh civil service around the 
time of devolution and the allocation of the first tranche of structural funds recalled a 
‘great fanfare that this [EU funding] … was going to open up our communities … would 
get them out of poverty’ (senior civil servant, governance). Yet, the same interviewee 
reflected on the situation at the end of the 2000-07 programming period:
[The Welsh] Government, I think, was in quite a difficult position whereby our 
GDP per capita in [West Wales and the Valleys] hadn’t really changed and we 
were still … below the European threshold. So, on the one hand this was a bit 
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of an indictment of all the money. Has the money been wasted? On the other, 
there was this [sense that] we still actually want to stay under the threshold 
because then we’ll qualify for another round of funding (senior civil servant, 
governance).
The last sentence of the quote above particularly shows how dependence developed 
in relation to cohesion funding. An attitude that there was value in staying ‘under the 
threshold’ took hold, partly due to the funding associated with maintaining Objective 1 
status, and also because of the implications of a drop in funding for the jobs of individuals 
working for the Welsh Government, local authorities, and related agencies.
Once instrumentalized, the discourse of dependence and victimhood took on a 
performative and self-fulfilling character. Our data show the discourse operating at two 
distinct scales. As the comments above suggest, the discourse existed at a regional scale. 
Interviewees at their bluntest told us that, if EU funding really ‘worked’, then West Wales 
and the Valleys would not have kept qualifying for it. Despite years of funding, a senior 
economic advisor concluded, ‘we started with a position of economic and social inequality 
and we certainly haven’t closed that gap’. Indeed, almost all our interviewees believed that 
EU funding had proved ultimately ineffective in Wales. Unsurprisingly, then, interviewees 
did not afford the 2014-20 structural funds allocation of €2.4 billion to Wales (Woolford and 
Hunt, 2016) the same ‘fanfare’ that had characterized the first years of funding. By this time, 
Wales as a whole had assumed ‘failing region’ status, and was no longer invoked as near 
imminent rescue. Rather, economic underperformance and socio-economic inequalities 
were discursively entrenched as issues ‘that bedevil us’ (senior advisor, economy).
A spatialized narrative of failure, dependency and victimhood also operated at 
smaller scales. For our interviewees, post-industrial and rural areas, particularly, served 
as spatial synonyms for inequality and deprivation, with both kinds of spaces viewed as 
distinctly ‘left behind’ by progress elsewhere. While EU funding programmes ostensibly 
promise to combat such uneven development within regions, in reality, economic 
activity in Wales continues to largely concentrate on ‘two main economic arteries’ 
(senior advisor, economy) along the southern and northern coastline, generating growth 
that other Welsh communities simply do not benefit from. An interviewee reflected:
Cardiff [the Welsh capital] as a city has seen some of the highest levels of 
economic growth and population growth compared to … any city in the UK. 
But you go 10 miles, 20 miles north [and] it hasn’t changed in 30 years (senior 
advisor, economy).
When interviewees described travelling short distances––‘10 miles, 20 miles’––and 
witnessing a perceptible socio-economic shift, they were invariably evoking a post-
industrial or rural area. A senior civil servant in health observed that, in Wales, ‘looking 
at geographies … tells a story about the inequity and the unfairness that people can 
buy into’. Such comments illustrate how certain spaces have taken on a particular 
status within the geographical imagination of politicians and policymakers alike. 
Localized inequalities have, thus, been narrated through: relational and topological 
understandings of space and distance (cf. Amin, 2004); discourses that conflate social 
and spatial inequalities (Townsend, 1979).
By describing the dependence and victimhood fostered through territorial 
cohesion approaches as a ‘narrative’, we do not mean that the socio-economic challenges 
bedevilling Wales lack substance. Real and objective challenges exist within and across 
Wales, as our interviewees were keen to point out, further criticizing the inability of 
EU funds to systematically address tangible inequalities: ‘how do you deal with some of 
those areas of deprivation and those real inequalities?’ (senior civil servant, governance). 
Our point here is that such inequalities have been consequently reworked into pervasive 
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discourses of failure and dependence, due partly to importing territorial cohesion 
framings into Wales. As one policymaker put it:
we keep talking about poverty. We keep talking about low skills. We keep 
talking about poor housing. And we keep coming up with programmes to fix it, 
but we never do (senior civil servant, governance).
While the inability to fundamentally address these issues may be because they are 
‘wicked problems’, we also suspect that part of the narrative hinges on policymakers, 
essentially, ‘talking about’ these issues as problems. Territorial cohesion invites the 
perversity of ‘lagging’ regions putting their failures on display. In Wales, the result 
has been a discourse of dependence, leading to little more than developmental stasis; 
EU funding has ‘basically just sustained where we were at’ (senior advisor, local 
government).
Yet against this backdrop, new kinds of narrative have emerged. For the Welsh 
Government (2017a: 15), the UK’s departure from the EU provides opportunities to 
‘think differently and work differently in ways which link policies together across 
portfolios and organisations’. Accordingly, the Welsh Government is attempting to 
think more pro-actively about long-term regional futures, instead of bemoaning a past 
and present characterized by injustice. We identify growing attention towards, first, 
envisaging more just and hopeful futures for Wales; and, second, developing regional 
capacities to shape those futures.
The Well-being of Future Generations Act 2015 is now the main vehicle 
for articulating a new vision for Wales. The Act seeks to mainstream sustainable 
development across all public bodies in Wales. Through an extensive consultation 
exercise, the Act also attempted to attune sustainable development ideals to the 
perceived priorities of the Welsh population (Jones and Ross, 2016), informing seven 
well-being goals (Welsh Government, 2015a: 3). The consultation envisioned a future 
Wales––‘The Wales We Want’––which would be more sustainable and more just. In 
a startlingly ambitious statement, the Welsh Government’s own submission to the 
consultation process insisted that:
In 2050, Wales will be the best place to live, learn, work and do business … 
Doing things differently is about looking forward so the choices we take secure 
a safe and prosperous future for us, for our children and for our grandchildren 
(Welsh Government, 2014: 1).
This ambitious language differs considerably from the dependence discourse we 
discussed above. Caution is of course needed in attempting to compare competing 
discourses, since we refer to different statements made for different audiences. Yet, we 
do consider that the language associated with the Well-being of Future Generations 
Act represents a shift in the Welsh Government’s approach to regional inequalities. 
Rather than a geography of problems and failure, the new well-being language attends 
to more progressive future goals. Rather than emphasizing past failure in expectation of 
future funds, present problems become inspiration for future action; as an interviewee 
involved in the Act’s development told us, ‘Wales has some of the highest rates of obesity 
in the world, some of the highest rates of teenage pregnancy … we need to change that 
as we’re going forward’ (senior advisor, Sustain Wales).
This shift in rhetoric is significant in its own right but there is also growing 
evidence that the emergence of this new agenda is having an impact on the ground in 
different public bodies in Wales. In one local authority in south Wales, respondents 
stressed that the Well-being Act had led to a change of emphasis in policy discussions, 
with, a more holistic take on well-being taking root, and one that emphasized an 
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apiration to create better standards of living for the inhabitants of the area in the future. 
One of our respondents put it as follows: ‘we have to complete boxes that literally ask, 
how are we addressing these issues? What are the implications for the future? No, I do 
think it’s important that, definitely’.
Recent statements have also focussed on the Welsh Government’s capacity 
to deliver these more hopeful futures, particularly post-Brexit. The Welsh 
Government’s (2017a: 24) position is now that ‘we want to take the best elements 
from our EU legacy and build a new future for the long-term’. In the same document, 
emphasis is placed on Wales’ capacity to influence its own future, especially since 
leaving the EU risks reinscribing UK-level macroeconomic policy on the devolved Welsh 
Government. This involves a call for ‘shared sovereignty’ with future ‘UK Government 
investments requir[ing] closer coordination with the Welsh Government to ensure they 
work with, not against, the grain of Wales’ economic policy’ (Welsh Government, 2017a: 
20). Furthermore, the Welsh Government (2017b: 27) has called for new forms of 
collaboration between Wales and the broader UK post-Brexit to protect Wales’ capacity 
to influence its own economic future; a capacity understood in relation to politics and 
sovereignty, and the ability to shape distinctive and relevant policies for Wales.
While we might decry the perhaps unrealistic ambition for Wales to be the ‘best 
place to live, learn, work and do business’, there is a clear attempt to envision a future 
in which Wales will be more prosperous, sustainable and just. This marks a discursive 
shift from the self-portrayal of Wales as the failing victim of processes beyond its control 
towards a future that Wales can itself influence. We see, in short, the beginning of a 
vision that seeks a more spatially just future for Wales.
 — New spaces and scales of governance
Our second empirical theme is concerned with the way in which territorial 
cohesion has influenced spaces of governance at the regional scale, and how Brexit 
and spatial justice signal the potential for new spatial transformations. Problematic 
spatialities are being rightly questioned, and new spaces and scales of regional 
governance are emerging; with the hope that these emergent forms will prove more 
spatially just.
The effective operationalization of EU cohesion policy through economic 
indicators (which we discuss in the following section) has led to the literal mapping of 
NUTS2 regions into ‘less developed,’ ‘transitional’ and ‘more developed’ categories (see 
Figure 1). Of the two NUTS2 regions in Wales, East Wales is classified as ‘more developed,’ 
with a GDP per capita greater than 90% of the EU average. The predominantly rural and 
post-industrial West Wales and the Valleys region has a GDP per capita below 75% of 
the EU average, and is classified as ‘less developed’ (formerly known as ‘Objective 1’). 
Yet, several scholars have drawn attention to how NUTS2 boundaries were deliberately 
redrawn in Wales in order to maximize EU funding eligibility (e.g. Boland, 2005; 
Gripaios and McVittie, 2003). A 1999 document produced under the auspices of Institute 
of Welsh Affairs put ‘the case for redrawing the deprivation map of Wales from the 
old north/south division to a new east/west configuration’ (Osmond, in Morgan and 
Price, 1999: 2), and noted Eurostat’s assent to a corresponding NUTS2 change. The 
report’s authors justified the new division:
For ordinary men and women, Wales today stands as a country clearly divided 
between the relatively prosperous, confident and accessible areas of the east, 
and the de-industrialised or crisis-torn rural communities to the west (Morgan 
and Price, 1999: 7).
However, Gripaios and Bishop (2006: 939) observed just a few years later that the 
redrawn NUTS2 regions ‘seem to lack economic logic and appear to be contrived to 
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ensure that as many of the 22 Unitary Authorities in [Wales] as possible qualify for 
[EU] funding’. The contrived separation of an allegedly prosperous ‘East Wales’ from 
a deprived ‘West Wales and the Valleys’ was readily acknowledged by many of our 
interviewees. As one straightforwardly explained:
In order to achieve eligibility for European funding … Wales was sort of cut in 
half. So, you’ve got what they call West Wales and the Valleys, which are the bits 
that are eligible for the highest level of European funding. Then you’ve got the 
rest … all the good bits economically (INT03, senior advisor, economy).
Multiple consequences have arisen from this spatial division. First, as we maintained 
in 4.1 above, the division has helped sustain a narrative of Wales, and particularly of 
post-industrial and rural spaces, as failing and dependent. Second, contrived NUTS2 
boundaries have been imposed on other, more meaningful, regions and localities. 
Neither East Wales nor West Wales and the Valleys are coherent regions functionally, 
geographically or historically. Further, funding boundaries have created an artificial 
dislocation between contiguous areas and pre-existing functional regions. For instance, 
an important functional region extends from the relatively prosperous Welsh capital, 
Cardiff, to some of the most deprived local authorities in the South Wales valleys; these 
connections are severed by the artificial assignment of these places to separate NUTS2 
regions. Several interviewees drew attention to the political and practical difficulties such 
separations induce. For example, an advisor working with local government explained the 
difficulties of developing coherent funded programmes and interventions that crossed 
NUTS2 boundaries. Two separate applications would be required for the same project 
(one for each region) and different levels of funding would be given to each, and would 
need to be meticulously accounted for. No matter how much practical sense working 
across the NUTS2 boundaries makes, interventions are often administratively stymied.
These working difficulties have also been acknowledged by the Welsh 
Government’s white paper Regional Investment in Wales After Brexit, which states:
The division of Wales into regions that reflected the primacy of EU statistical 
classification in determining eligibility for, and hence management of, EU 
funding streams, was consistent with the EU-wide approach to regional 
allocation, but did not in all cases align with local level need (Welsh 
Government, 2017a: 18).
The UK’s imminent departure from the EU has indeed been associated with some relief 
that regional investment policies can now be rethought. The white paper anticipates 
new geographical possibilities for regional development beyond the NUTS2 map:
A potential benefit of being outside of the EU will be the opportunity to work 
more systematically with functional regional areas that reflect the economic 
reality in each part of Wales, rather than being constrained by the current 
geographical and fund-specific limitations. We will no longer need to separate 
parts of West and East Wales artificially, or address the needs of rural areas, 
people, and businesses entirely separately (Welsh Government, 2017a: 14).
Alongside reiterating the challenges of promoting economic development and social 
policy through artificial, instrumentally-defined regions, this statement interestingly 
highlights the possibility of working with ‘functional regional areas that reflect the 
economic reality in each part of Wales’. Some new and potentially innovative spatial 
imaginaries are at work here, including interconnections between cities and rural 
hinterlands, and productive links between North Wales and the adjacent ‘Northern 
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Powerhouse’ in North-West England (Welsh Government, 2017a: 19). Recent emphasis 
on city regions as a new scale of governance within the UK (Harrison, 2012) provides an 
additional emergent spatial reference, with the Welsh Government’s post-Brexit vision 
including four regional ‘growth deals’. There is already some evidence that the growth 
deal model has influenced how the current round of EU structural funds have been used 
in Wales. For instance, a local government interviewee described how recent projects 
were responding to the need to develop ‘more regional ways of working’ by trying to 
attend more to city regions than NUTS2 agglomerates.
There are, therefore, interesting attempts afoot to envisage different geographies 
of governance for a post-Brexit Wales––geographies unconstrained by the instrumental 
responses to, and regulatory requirements, of territorial cohesion. Our interviews and 
documentary research indicate a growing admission by Welsh policymakers that the 
regional geographies associated with cohesion have been meaningless, unhelpful and, 
by extension, unjust. Yet, we might ask whether emergent regional approaches are any 
more grounded in notions of spatial justice. While city regions and growth deals do 
place some emphasis on accessing services and addressing perceived social need, the 
policy documents we consulted largely view these approaches as economic ends (e.g. 
Welsh Government, 2017a). There is thus a danger that in sticking to a narrow focus 
on certain indicators of economic success, new regional ways of working could simply 
replicate the problems we have identified with the existing NUTS2 boundaries.
New spaces and scales of governance have also appeared in the context of the 
Well-being of Future Generations Act. Although not explicitly spatial in approach, the 
Act is grounded in localities in Wales through the creation of Public Services Boards 
(hereafter PSBs), which are largely based on local authority boundaries, and which are 
tasked with producing local well-being assessments and setting localized objectives 
towards the national well-being goals (Jones, 2019). The first tranche of assessments 
were released in 2017. This delegation of responsibility to PSBs can be viewed as a 
positive attempt to spatialize justice within Wales by enabling different understandings 
of well-being to emerge in different local authority areas. Different emphases have 
indeed emerged on the ground. The well-being assessment from post-industrial Torfaen, 
in south-east Wales, for example, highlights the challenges associated with chronic 
health conditions, inter-generational patterns of poverty, and the need to provide a 
healthy start for children and young people (Torfaen PSB, 2017). By contrast, Gwynedd 
and Anglesey PSB (2017), in rural and Welsh-speaking north-west Wales, has identified 
the need to preserve communities, protect and promote the Welsh language, understand 
the effects of demographic change, and ensure the availability of affordable housing 
(Jones and Lewis, 2019).
The above evidence demonstrates that the impact of the Well-being Act extends 
well beyond a shift in national rhetoric, important though that is. The Act has led to 
the emergence of new well-being priorities in different parts of Wales. Under previous 
understandings of territorial cohesion, Gwynedd and Anglesey and Torfaen would 
have been subsumed into West Wales and the Valleys and a common socio-economic 
indicator relating to GDP would have been applicable in both areas. Now, with a new 
focus on more localized interpretations of spatial justice, alternative visions of well-
being can flourish. As a respondent from Gwynedd put it simply, ‘there’s not going to be 
the same solutions for everywhere, is there?’.
Nevertheless, questions arise about the extent to which local well-being 
assessments really reflect a spatial approach to well-being. In a publicly released review 
of Well-being Assessments and Goals, the Future Generations Commissioner for Wales 
(established under the Act) commented that:
The assessments acknowledge the importance of local spaces as assets, 
acknowledge their roles in people’s well-being and consider how people 
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engage and interact with these places. However, most well-being assessments 
showed very limited consideration of the significance or cause of spatial 
differences (OFGC, 2017: 15).
The Commissioner’s feedback encourages PSBs to think more deeply about the 
relationship between space and well-being; to move beyond viewing space as merely a 
container for (in)justice, viewing it instead as something that contributes to (in)justice 
in far-reaching ways (Dabinett, 2011: 2391).
 — Beyond GDP: imagining new measures of success
A third shift in discourses revolves around the definition of success and the 
‘good life’. We discern growing efforts in Wales to broaden conceptualizations of success 
beyond macroeconomic measures like GDP/GVA, instead taking into account broader 
conceptualizations of well-being and justice.
Many of our interviewees critiqued what they saw as an over-emphasis within 
territorial cohesion policies on GDP as a measure of regional success or failure. Despite 
discourses of ‘investment’, territorial cohesion is still measured according to a normative 
economic view in which the ultimate concern is the regional distribution of GDP. Yet, 
as we considered in the section above, many interviewees were highly aware that what 
gets counted as a regional inequality depends on where the dividing lines are drawn. 
For them, economic indicators particularly concretized the contingent in unhelpful 
ways. GDP was especially criticized as a ‘blunt instrument … [that] doesn’t really tell us 
much about what’s going on underneath’ (civil servant, Welsh European Funding Office). 
Similarly, a senior advisor compared economic indicators to well-being, reflecting:
nowhere do we say the purpose of our economic policy is to increase GVA. 
Whereas the comparisons that we tend to do nationally, internationally are 
[on this basis] … and that masks a whole range of other things … Your GVA 
could be going up and that can still mean that you’ve got some terrible things 
happening for particular types of people and particular communities (senior 
advisor, well-being).
This comment suggests how exclusively economic measures of regional success can fail 
to connect meaningfully with local development needs. The dangers of this mismatch 
are self-evident, and include, as we described above, attempts by regions to redefine how 
they are constructed in EU statistics.
Issues of comparison are a further consideration. While common measures 
like GDP offer scope for useful comparisons across the EU map, they can also lead to 
unhelpful comparisons between regions. For example, some interviewees perceived 
GDP as a tool used to critique regions deemed to be consistently underperforming: 
‘we have been pointed towards regions in Europe that had started off as receiving the 
highest levels of aid and then have gone to grow out of those … So, they’ve done it. Why 
can’t you?’ (civil servant, Wales European Funding Office). While territorial cohesion 
compares Wales statistically to purportedly more successful regions, Welsh policy-
makers reported that they were more interested in more meaningful comparisons 
with regions of similar size and circumstance. Largely, this involves ‘using the best of 
other countries’ (senior civil servant, social services) through good practice models, 
rather than benchmarking indicators. The majority of the individuals we interviewed 
resisted Wales being ‘measured up’ with other regions, and were neither intellectually 
nor professional engaged by notions of ‘catching up’ with them. Rather, they wanted to 
tackle inequalities within Wales.
By ascribing success in macroeconomic terms and through regional comparisons, 
therefore, territorial cohesion is far from enabling. As Lea (2008: 16) insists, through 
FROM TERRITORIAL COHESION TO REGIONAL SPATIAL JUSTICE 15
such an ‘interventionary lens’, ‘the idea that life might be lived differently with value 
and meaning or that ‘need’ might be conceived of differently from the way in which 
we calculate it … becomes impossible to imagine’. A lens focussed on macroeconomic 
indicators makes it especially difficult to imagine or enable more regionally appropriate 
definitions of well-being and the good life. Spatial justice, we contend, can provide 
an alternative route for regions to actively define their own futures, using their own 
measures of success (Sen, 2009).
We hinted above at how the Well-being of Future Generations Act is seeking 
to promote alternative approaches to development and the good life. The ‘Wales We 
Want’ consultation exercise aimed to develop a distinctly Welsh take on sustainable 
development, reflecting Welsh values (Jones and Ross, 2016). This included a concerted 
effort to highlight notions of justice. A Sustainable Development Report published 
by the Welsh Government (2012: 5) in 2012 stated that Wales ‘has its own account of 
sustainable development’, with an ‘emphasis on social, economic and environmental 
wellbeing for people and communities, embodying our values of fairness and social 
justice’. The Welsh Government’s (2014: 1) submission to ‘The Wales We Want’ similarly 
stated that ‘[w]e need people to be healthy, to achieve their potential and to make 
Wales a more equal society’. Interviewees who engaged with civil servants in other 
jurisdictions further emphasized Wales’ distinctive approach. As a senior manager 
from Natural Resources Wales (the organization responsible for managing the Welsh 
environment) explained:
If you look at our aim [Natural Resources Wales], the remit letter we receive from 
government talks about outcomes and it’s true that that relates to more than just 
the environment. There’s far more of an emphasis on reducing poverty etc than 
you would find with the Environment Agency, with the Countryside Commission 
in England.
This emphasis on notions of justice within Wales’ interpretation of sustainable 
development was reinforced by the renaming of the Sustainable Development Bill as 
the Well-being of Future Generations Act. Interview evidence suggests that part of the 
reasoning behind this change in nomenclature revolved around a perceived need to 
highlight the broader understandings of well-being and justice that were to be promoted 
by the Act (Jones and Ross, 2016).
The Act arguably, therefore, possesses a distinctly Welsh ‘take’ on sustainable 
development, well-being and justice. The Welsh Government’s commitment to achieving 
these just futures is made concrete in the form of the various measures of progress 
towards future well-being. Rather than the macroeconomic ‘blunt instruments’ our 
interviewees critiqued above, the Act experiments with different ways to assess well-
being. There are currently 46 indicators tracked by Statistics Wales as part of the Act, 
including: the gender pay gap (indicator 17); percentages of people moderately or very 
satisfied with their jobs (indicator 20); satisfaction with access to facilities and services 
(indicator 24); the proportion of the population that can speak Welsh (indicator 37) 
(Welsh Government, 2015b; 2015c). It is these multiple measures, above all else, which 
testify to Wales’ attempt to recalibrate understandings of the just futures that the Welsh 
government should be attempting to create.
Admittedly, these alternative measures can be criticized. The Welsh 
Government’s (2015c) technical guidance especially leaves us with a sense that the 
indicators chosen are less innovative than reflective of data that is already being 
collected by different government agencies, such as the UK Labour Force Survey and 
the National Survey of Wales. There is a suspicion, accordingly, that other potential 
vectors of spatial justice might well have been omitted, partly because the collection of 
data to monitor progress in relation to them had been viewed as being either difficult 
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or costly. Yet, new questions are evidently being asked by policymakers: ‘how good are 
our relationships? What’s the area we live in like? … Can we travel to see friends and 
do activities and do all of those sorts of things?’ (senior civil servant, well-being). For 
many working on the well-being agenda, these kinds of questions do represent a new 
departure. And as we showed earlier, policymakers working in different various local 
authorities and linked to different PSBs are beginning: (1) to ask different questions 
about their localities; (2) emphasize contrasting visions of well-being (in assessments 
and future goals). We contend that the attempt to develop augmented understandings 
of well-being and, by extension, justice, point the way to how an approach informed by 
spatial justice principles might allow policymakers to think more creatively about the 
kinds of regions they are trying to create.
Conclusions
Although broader in premise and potential, the EU’s concept of territorial 
cohesion has materially proceeded through a concern with distributions of financial 
resources and narrowly defined macroeconomic measures of developmental ‘success’. 
In Wales, the heavy financing of regional development has reflected both persistent 
inequalities and what we have described as a reactive narrative of victimhood and 
dependence. After 18 years of structural funds investment, West Wales and the Valleys 
is still classified as a ‘less developed’ region, and discourses of failure continue to 
be affixed to Wales as a whole. Unsurprisingly, our interviewees considered that 
European funding has been ineffective in addressing regional inequalities in Wales. We 
agree; yet not just on the basis of stalled indicators or deprived communities. As we 
have argued, the operationalization of territorial cohesion goals has failed to enable 
alternative, more regionally apt visions of well-being and the good life to emerge. 
Through the macroeconomic map imposed by territorial cohesion policies, Wales can 
only ape more successful European regions, using rules those ‘winners’ have already 
set by default.
But the evidence from Wales also suggests that other approaches to addressing 
inequalities are possible. We discern a notable turn in Welsh policy away from narratives 
of ‘Welsh problems’ towards envisioning, to borrow the title of the Welsh Government’s 
recent sustainable development consultation exercise, ‘The Wales We Want’. As we 
have argued, these changes constitute a shift in regional development approaches that 
resonate with––and have the potential to be more directly informed by––principles of 
spatial justice. Three key shifts were highlighted above: a change from narratives of 
dependence to regional capacities to act; the emergence of new spaces and scales of 
governance; a redefinition of measures of success beyond macroeconomic indicators. 
While we neither contend that these shifts embody spatial justice, nor that they are the 
inverse of the territorial cohesion agenda, we do believe that they constitute positive 
steps for Welsh public policy. More broadly, we consider that these changes suggest 
possibilities for regional development approaches elsewhere that are directly informed 
by spatial justice. This is not to suggest a transferable ‘Welsh model’. Rather, the case of 
Wales suggests that regionalizing spatial justice is possible, preferable and, amidst the 
crisis of EU Cohesion Policy, necessary.
The discussion also poses some significant conceptual questions about spatial 
justice. With a few notable exceptions, much of the research on spatial justice to date 
has concentrated on the city as a space and scale. The case study of Wales shows, 
however, that academics and policymakers must grapple with some serious issues 
when attempting to ‘translate’ spatial justice to the regional scale (Prince, 2012). At the 
very least, spatial justice calls for approaches to be tailored to each specific region’s 
distinctive visions and capacities to act. Other questions abound. To what extent can one 
pursue spatial justice solely at a regional scale, thereby underplaying the specific needs 
of particular localities? To what extent does envisioning justice at the larger scale of the 
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region change the spatial, socio-economic and political dynamics through which that 
justice is achieved? To what extent does defining visions of well-being and justice at a 
regional scale, unless one is careful, lead to unhelpful and unrealistic boundaries being 
created between contiguous regions? To what extent would a pursuit of spatial justice at 
the regional scale inevitably privilege metropolitan and urban interests at the expense of 
rural ones (cf. Jones and MacLeod, 1999)? Conversely, can a delegation of the definition 
of spatial justice to more local scales within regions––as has been the case with PSBs 
in Wales––lead to a situation in which understandings of justice vary geographically in 
potentially unhelpful ways (e.g. in relation to access to services)? In short, we need to 
examine the extent to which the spaces and scales over which justice is being articulated 
influence the extent to which justice can be realized.
If these are important issues in the particular context of Wales, they are even 
more pertinent when one seeks to upscale the idea of spatial justice to Europe as a 
whole. One important thread within the literature on spatial justice, as we have seen, 
is that individuals, groups, cities, regions and states can seek to define their specific 
understanding of justice (Storper, 2011: 19). If this is the case, then equal scope must 
be given to those same stakeholders to articulate the spaces and scales over which that 
search for justice occurs. The upshot of all this is that the most appropriate spaces and 
scales to achieve justice might vary from one place to another; spaces and scales of more 
just governance might work more effectively in some places than others. There is a need, 
therefore, for a spatial sensitivity in relation to spatial justice. Social scientists should 
lead in attempts, not just to analyse this spatial variation, but also to enable the most 
effective governmental configurations to be developed to promote spatial justice within 
particular geographical settings.
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